DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry
198th Infantry Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96374
ADVF-BCN 3 December 1970
SUBJECT: Transition of US Tactics in the Batangan
Area from March 1970 to the present
date
TO: Commanding Officer
198th Infantry Brigade
23rd Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96374
1. On 23 November 1970, GEN Abrams, LTG Sutherland and MG Baldwin
were briefed by LTC
Woerner, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, on the transition
that has taken place in
the battalion's area of operations.
2. General Abrams expressed interest in the changing pattern of
US tactical operations and
requested that portion of the briefing be prepared in manuscript form
and submitted to him
through the intermediate Commanders.
3. The inclosed document describes the transition of US tactics
in the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry
during the period 22 March 1970 to the present date.
1 Incl
FRED F. WOERNER
as
LTC, Infantry
Commanding
Transition of US Tactics in the Batangan
22 March 1970 - 1 December 1970
On 22 March 1970, the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry assumed responsibility
for Operation
Nantucket Beach from the 5th Battalion, 45th Infantry in the area of
operations generally known
as the Batangan. Since that date the Battalion’s scheme of maneuver
has been in a state of
transition passing through three identifiable phases and currently
is entering a fourth stage of
development. This evolution has as its catalyst the dynamics
of the battlefield, and the tactics
which characterize each of the phases were designed in response to
various factors, the more
important of which are: battalion mission, enemy strength, enemy tactics,
engineer land clearing,
supporting fires, and the rules of engagement as pertain to employment
of artillery. It is the
purpose of this paper to briefly describe and explain in terms of the
influencing factors the
transition of the battalion’s tactics during the past nine months.
In late March, the 1/6 Infantry moved into the Batangan with the
primary mission of
destroying the 48th VC Battalion, a force of approximately 200 seasoned
combat veterans who
had the reputation for elusiveness and survivability. Numerous
intelligence reports on the location
of the 48th VC Battalion were either inaccurate or indicative of a
highly mobile unit, for they
showed widely scattered locations without any general pattern of movement.
The 1/6 Infantry,
experiencing a certain lack of in depth knowledge of the modus operandi
of the enemy in the new
area of operations and faced with the possibility of engaging a formidable
force, opted for
company sweep type operations. These tactics normally took the
form of rapid reaction by one
company to the suspect enemy location by the execution of a tactical
foot march on single or
multiple axes. When in proximity of the reported enemy, a company
patrol base or defensive
position was established from which platoons conducted daylight patrols
and night ambushes.
Beginning late in May, the US engineer activity in the Batangan
became the single most
important factor in determining the battalion’s tactical employment.
At the peak of the
construction season there were elements of four engineer companies
working on three distinct
road construction projects and one land clearing project. The
1/6 Infantry was assigned the
mission of securing the engineers; this was accomplished by collocating
a rifle company with an
engineer element and from this base providing security through a combination
of defensive
position perimeter defense, work site security, daylight patrolling
and night ambushing – all usually
executed at platoon level. This security responsibility greatly limited
the offensive maneuverability
of the battalion; therefore, in late August, Brigade changed the mission
from one of securing the
engineer operations with US troops to one of coordinating security
utilizing Popular and Regional
Forces. This change permitted the battalion to reorient offensively
against the enemy without
being tied to specific bases of operation or limited to special locales
within the area of operations.
Meanwhile, various conditions became evident that would permit
a radical change to the
tactical employment of the battalion’s subordinate units. The
more important of these were the
continued progress of the land clearing operation; significant changes
to enemy strength and troop
disposition, increased knowledge of enemy tactics, and the availability
of massive on call fire
support.
The land clearing operation has had a quite significant impact
on the area of operation.
First and foremost it has denied the enemy refuge areas and concealed
avenues of approach. The
Batangan is florally characterized by thickly vegetated hill masses,
interspersed in the coastal
lowlands which are sected by hedgerows forming a checkerboard grid
pattern of small fields
bounded on all four sides by hedge with is approximately two meters
wide at the base and two to
three meters tall, forming a virtually impenetrable wall to unaided
foot travel and limiting
observation to twenty meters. The VC have long taken advantage
of these hedgerows by cutting
paths centered on and parallel to the long axis; in certain areas the
trails were made more secure
by the digging of trench lines. This enabled the enemy to come
into close proximity to friendly
elements, engage with small arms fire and the escape unobserved.
Land clearing has proven to be
a double edged sword; for as it has denied concealment to the enemy
and thus reduced their
security and restricted their movement, it has also afforded greatly
increased observation and
concomitantly increased opportunity for the utilization of observed
artillery fires by friendly
elements.
By late August, it became evident that there had been a significant
change in enemy troop
disposition and strength within the Batangan. Most important
was the movement west of the
majority of the 48th VC Battalion which meant that the possibility
of contact with a greater than
VC company size unit (average strength of 40) was greatly diminished.
Furthermore, the combat
effective strength of the remaining main force units was on a gradual
but steady decline.
Concurrently, increased knowledge of the enemy’s tactics and operational
techniques was
acquired. The fact was that all enemy units were avoiding engagement
with US forces and were
relying on harassing small arms fire and on the employment of mines
and booby traps. Contrary
to popular opinion, the Batangan is not one massive mine field.
Rather the enemy had analyzed
our movement pattern and was totally aware that an infantryman on one
hill top and heading in a
certain direction would sooner or later climb the next piece of dominant
terrain to either check his
bearings, gain observation, or occupy defensible terrain for his night
defensive position (NDP).
The enemy capitalized on their knowledge of our movement pattern and
planted mines and booby
traps in our line of advance and at future NDP’s causing numerous friendly
casualties. (Of the
249 casualties suffered by the 1/6 Infantry in the Batangan since 22
March 1970, 203 have been
the result of mines and booby traps.)
Thus a change in tactics was encouraged on one hand by land clearing
and enemy strength
and demanded on the other by the unacceptable losses due to mines and
booby traps. In light of
the enemy situation and the quantity of immediately responsive supporting
fire power available, it
was decided that under the existing condition the small unit (platoon,
half platoon, squad) is an
independently viable force in this particular area of operation.
With this, the 1/6 Infantry
commenced its third phase of tactical evolution, small unit night operations
with emphasis on
night ambushes. The general concept has been to saturate an area
with numerous small units (the
limiting factor being the availability of PRC-25 radios), moving into
ambush positions under cover
of darkness and holding them for up to three days (the limit of supply)
if not compromised. When
movement is required it is usually of short distance, almost always
at night and with disregard for
dominant terrain except in the case of the company command post.
In this way initiative has been
taken from the guerrilla; he does not know where the US elements are,
nor can he determine
where they are going. Furthermore, by positioning friendly units
along his lines of communication
and on the routes of entrance to and egress from the hamlets inside
the rural development (RD)
line, he has been denied the relative freedom of movement that he once
enjoyed.
The increased observation and surveillance of enemy inhabited
areas has confirmed that
the enemy is moving throughout the day but with high points during
early morning (0400-0700)
and late afternoon (1600-1900)-the minimum light hours. During
the night hours the VC are
apparently sleeping soundly in the numerous hamlets falling outside
the GVN’s sphere of
influence. They are, I am sure, quite well aware of the Rules
of Engagement and the specific
limitations against the employment of indirect fires on or in the vicinity
of hamlets, friendly or
otherwise. Compound this with the fact that the Batangan, particularly
within the VC utilized
hamlets, is undermined with tunnels, bunkers and spider holes and one
is faced with the problem
of neutralizing the enemy inside populated hamlets while denying him
the 30 second warning that
is all he requires to make his escape.
To deny the enemy his comparative security in the hamlets under
tactical conditions
requiring virtually absolute surprise, the 1/6 Infantry has recently
progressed into its fourth and
current phase of combat operations, the small unit night raid.
While continuing to employ the
tactics o the third phase, the battalion, operating normally in half
platoon sized forces, is
conducting night raids targeted on suspect enemy hutches. The
results to date indicate the
probability of good success.
This transition of tactics in reaction to various factors, some
directive and others
permissive, has resulted in increasing success for the 1/6 Infantry.
A statistical comparison of the
most recent five months against the first four months in the Batangan
indicates a 47% decrease in
VC main force strength, a 49% increase in VC killed in action, and
a 63% decrease in US
casualties.
The current tactics are in no way considered a final or absolute
solution for the
neutralization of enemy forces in the Batangan. To the contrary,
they are nothing more than a
feasible approach based on the current situation. As the conditions
change, the tactics will
continue to be modified.
FRED F. WOERNER
LTC, Infantry
Commaning
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------