1.  On 11 April 1971, the 1st Bn 6th Inf continued tactical operations as part of the 198th Inf Bde
Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK.  The 1st Bn 6th Inf Tactical Area of Operations (TAOR)
expanded westward in the shape of large triangle across highway QL1 to the vicinity of Tra Bong.
From the southern edge of Chu Lai and south to Quang Ngai, the TAOR encompassed all the area
from the coast to Tra Bong.  This area included both the northern and southern “Rocket Pocket,”
an area within five or six miles of Chu Lai base, from which the VC/NVA launched rocket
attacks.

 a.  A variety of challenging terrain came with the increased responsibility of an area of
operations that more than tripled in size.  To the northwest lay high mountain ridges covered with
double canopy jungle forest (photos), while the area to the southwest resembled the low hills and
checkerboard fields similar to those in the Batangan where the 1st Bn 6th Inf had operated for over
a year.

 b.  The enemy in the new TAOR included the 107th NVA Heavy Weapons Battalion
(122mm rocket capability), the 78th Rocket Company (with a reported strength of 90 men) and
the 402nd, 406th, and 409th Sapper Battalions.

 (1) In September 1970, the 406th Sapper Battalion had launched a coordinated sapper and
mortar attack on the Tra Bong Special Forces Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camp at
(BS 342 883), resulting in KIA -- 1 US, 13 CIDG, and 20 VN; WIA -- 9 US and 60 VN, at a
cost of only 20 VC KIA.  SF Detachment A-107, Co C, 5th Special Forces Group had been in
charge of the CIDG camp.  Normally a CIDG camp consisted of the 5th SF A Team (operations,
intelligence, medical, communications, supply, and demolitions specialists) advising Vietnamese SF
soldiers, four 132 man CIDG companies, two combat recon platoons of 34 men each, a civic action
and psyops squad, and a RR section.  On 31 August  1970, 486 of the civilian irregulars at the
camp were absorbed into the Vietnamese Army and became the 61st ARVN Ranger Battalion.  The
attack appeared to be timed to test the new ARVN Battalion composed of former CIDG irregulars.

 (2)  The apparent success of the 406th Sapper Battalion at Tra Bong in September was not
duplicated on 25 February 1971 when the 1st Co, 406th Sapper Battalion, 3rd Company,
48th Battalion, and 2nd Company, 107th Heavy Weapons Battalion, attacked an RF unit at BS 537
885.  The VC/NVA lost 20 KIA inside the perimeter and 15 more KBA outside the wire.

 (3)  The 78th Rocket Company had the mission of rocketing Chu Lai base.  From Nov 70 to
30 Apr 71, they had done so five times with limited success.

 (4) The 409th Sapper Battalion (with a strength of approximately 260) was considered the
greatest threat.  On 28 March 1971, they had attacked the 1st Bn 46th Inf at FSB Mary Ann (AT
961 998) resulting in 30 US KIA, 82 US WIA, 1 x 155mm destroyed, and 1x155mm damaged at
a loss of approximately 12 VC KIA.  Saturation employment of satchel charges caused extensive
damage to the command and communication bunker, fighting positions, and individual sleeping
bunkers.  See     “60 Minutes of Terror at Mary Ann” by Al Hemmingway, "Mary Ann" - a
document on the Americal Data Base 2000 CD, available from the ADVA.  See also, Sappers in
the Wire: The Life and Death of Firebase Mary Ann, by Keith William Nolan, Pocket Books.

 (5) Elements of the 107th NVA Heavy Weapons Battalion operated in the western Son Tinh
District in support of the 406th and 48th Battalion.  On 27 April 1971, the 107th NVA Heavy
Weapons Battalion attacked LZ Dottie with five 122mm rockets.  Although the 1st Bn 6th Inf
TOC was struck by shrapnel, damage was minimal as most of the rockets landed just outside
the southwest perimeter of the base.  Subsequent operations disclosed that the rockets had
been fired from portable wooden tripods emplaced at near maximum range to the northwest
of LZ Dottie.

 c.  Enemy soldiers in the west and northwest region of the expanded area were more
heavily armed and traveled in groups of up to twenty-five soldiers.  Other large groups were used
to carry rice and supplies to local forces.  Headquarters facilities for regimental sized forces
reportedly were in the area.  Facilities for enemy logistical and hospital support were sometimes
encountered.  The enemy in the southwest section of the TAOR continued their use of mines,
booby traps, and hit and run tactic.  During road building operations from QL1 to LZ Stinson, the
enemy continued to confront the soldiers of 1st Bn 6th Inf on practically a daily basis.

2.  Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK, which involved all three infantry battalions (i.e. 1st Bn 6th Inf,
1st Bn 52nd Inf, and 5th Bn 46th Inf) in the 198th Bde, terminated on 1 July 1971.  According to the
23rd Inf Div Operations Report Lessons Learned, cumulative results (11 Apr-1 July 1971) were as
follows:

                                         US                                    Enemy

                                        50        Killed in Action         463
                                      409        Wounded in Action   (Not estimated)
                                        64        Slightly wounded       (Not estimated)
                                          0        MIA/POW               17 NVA, 11 VC
                                                    Detained Persons     184
                                                    Weapons Captured  122 Individual/16 Crew

The magnitude of US losses are significant, as each line infantry battalion had a field operating
strength of not more than 450 men.

3.  Historical context:  it should be noted that the western portion of the 1st Battalion 6th Infantry
tactical area of operations for MIDDLESEX PEAK had been the scene of horrific fighting against
the 21st NVA Regiment by the US Marines in 1966.

     a.  Operation UTAH began on 4 March 1966 with three Marine infantry battalions (2/7th,
3/1st, 2/4th) and the 1st South Vietnamese Airborne Battalion, in the Chau Nhai village complex
just west of Dai Loc.  In one two-hour period in the early morning hours of 5 March, Marine
artillery fired 1,900 155mm artillery rounds in support from Binh Son.  The NVA were fighting
from caves, tunnels, and bunkers.  Total losses:  US 98 KIA, 278 WIA; ARVN 30 KIA, 120
WIA; one F-4 and several helicopters shot down; 143 NVA KIA (by body count, but 600
estimated) 5 NVA POW; three 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft machine-guns, and  49 weapons captured.

     b.  Operation INDIANA on 28 March 1966 found the 1st Battalion 7th Marines fighting the
21st NVA Regiment in the area near Vin Loc (1) at BS 545 805, just west of Dai Loc.  Eleven
Marines died and 55 were wounded, while the NVA lost 69 KIA, numerous wounded, and two
12.7mm Anti-Aircraft machine-guns.  One Medal of Honor and two Navy Crosses were awarded
as a result of the short but furious fight.

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